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Abstract
The Jones Act seaman has de facto power over whether a jury will
hear his claim through his ability, under Panama Railroad v. Johnson, to
elect that his claim proceed at law or in admiralty. A significant conflict
of laws exists between the federal circuits and several state courts
regarding whether this election power means the seaman may divest the
defendant of the right to a jury trial by later amending his complaint from
law to admiralty. The Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff whose at-law
Jones Act claim rests on non-diversity jurisdiction may amend his
complaint to elect admiralty jurisdiction, even if the defendant previously
demanded a jury trial. Several federal circuits that have opined on the
issue, including the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, have adopted similar
views.
Nevertheless, and although a state high court’s opinion on how
cases proceed in federal court is purely dicta, Illinois has rejected the
Fifth Circuit’s view, placing it squarely in conflict with the Seventh
Circuit. Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court, in Endicott v. Icicle
Seafoods, Inc., adopted Illinois’s view as its own, placing it in conflict, at
least nominally, with the Ninth Circuit. This article evaluates Endicott in
light of the confusion created by the jurisdictional split and argues that
the State of Washington’s entry into the fray is more likely to invite
review by the Supreme Court of the United States, which should grant
certiorari to resolve the conflicts of law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Jones Act (alternatively “the Act”) creates a statutory
negligence cause of action allowing a seaman (or his personal
representative in case of death) to sue his employer for injuries suffered
during the course of employment.1 The Act specifies that “the seaman
may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury.”2
To spare the Act from challenge on the grounds that Congress had
unconstitutionally diminished the federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction in
favor of their common law jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ruled, in
Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, that a seaman has the choice to sue at
law or in admiralty.3 The Johnson Court also upheld the Jones Act
plaintiff’s right to make this election between law and admiralty against
a substantive due process challenge that the statutory grant of the
election to the plaintiff, but not the defendant-employer, was
“unreasonably discriminatory and purely arbitrary.”4 The Court aptly
reasoned, “There are many instances in the law where a person entitled
to sue may choose between alternative measures of redress and modes of
enforcement . . . . [I]t has never been held . . . that to permit such a
choice . . . is a violation of due process of law.”5
According to a recent case from the Washington Supreme Court,
Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., the Johnson Court left open the question
whether the plaintiff’s election power is a right to determine the mode of
trial (jury or nonjury) or merely the right to select the Jones Act claim’s
jurisdictional basis (law or admiralty).6 If the former view is correct,
then the plaintiff’s election power actually would be tantamount to a
right to control whether a jury can hear the claim, regardless of the
defendant’s preference.7 If the latter view is correct, then the plaintiff
would have the initial right to determine the jurisdiction, and the right to
a jury would be merely incident, potentially leaving the defendant a
vested right to try the case before a jury if the plaintiff first elects
jurisdiction at law.8 By ruling in favor of the latter, the Washington
1

Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
Id. (emphasis added). Hereinafter, this statutory right is referred to as the
plaintiff’s election power.
3 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924); see David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley,
Understanding Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of
the Seaman’s Elections Under the Jones Act, 14 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 229, 237 (2001); see
also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (granting the Supreme Court power over “all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”).
4 Johnson, 264 U.S. at 392.
5 Id. at 392–93.
6 Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 224 P.3d 761, 765 (Wash. 2010).
7 See id. at 763, 765.
8 Id. at 765.
2
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Supreme Court’s opinion in Endicott entered it into what it considered a
jurisprudential split between those two views.9
This paper examines the case history leading up to Endicott and
asserts that there are actually three, not two, jurisprudential views of the
plaintiff’s election power.10 Although Washington conflates the Fifth
Circuit’s view with the Illinois Supreme Court’s view, the two positions
are actually distinguishable.11 This paper contends that the Fifth
Circuit’s cases on point were wrongly decided because they read the
plaintiff’s election power too broadly.12 Moreover, this paper argues that
California’s view, addressed infra, is a misreading of the Fifth Circuit’s
view and is wrong.13 Thus, this issue is ripe for Supreme Court
certiorari.14 Illinois’s view, on which Endicott leans, is the most
jurisprudentially coherent.15 Ideally, the Supreme Court should overrule
the Fifth Circuit’s view of the plaintiff’s election power and adopt
Illinois’s interpretation regarding the manner in which federal cases
designated at law should proceed.16 At the very least, the Supreme Court
should uphold the authority of the States to configure the rights to jury
trials in state Jones Act cases as they see fit.17
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fifth Circuit’s View of the Plaintiff’s Election Power in
Rachal
In Rachal v. Ingram Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’
leading decision addressing the Jones Act plaintiff’s election power, the
court examined whether the defendant, Ingram, retained a vested right to
trial by jury in a Jones Act claim after the seaman-plaintiff, Rachal, had
initially demanded a jury.18 Although the plaintiff’s complaint had
demanded a jury trial, the plaintiff had filed a contradictory cover sheet
9 Id. at 765, 767. Endicott defines the split of authority as “among federal and state
courts as to which interpretation of Johnson is correct, with the Ninth Circuit and
California on one side and the Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Louisiana, and Illinois on
the other.” Id. at 765. The Washington Supreme Court followed the Illinois view. Id. at
767.
10 See infra Parts II, IV(A).
11 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; infra Part IV(A)(1)–(2).
12 See infra Part IV(B).
13 See infra Part IV(C).
14 See infra notes 255–62 and accompanying text; infra Part V.
15 See infra Part IV(D).
16 See infra Part V.
17 See infra Part V.
18 795 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1986).
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designating the claim in admiralty under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(h).19 The plaintiff amended his complaint a year later to clarify that the
claim was , in fact, an action in admiralty.20 The defendant asserted a
right to a jury trial, which the plaintiff moved to strike.21 The district
court granted the motion to strike, holding that the plaintiff did not need
the defendant’s consent under Rule 39(a).22
The district court determined that the only two bases for jurisdiction
were the general maritime law and the Jones Act.23 It reasoned that the
rule otherwise requiring a defendant’s consent to amend a complaint’s
demand for a jury trial was inapplicable because “no right to a jury trial
existed for” defendant Ingram.24 As the Seventh Amendment does not
protect the right to jury trial in admiralty cases, the district court
impliedly reasoned that only the Jones Act plaintiff has the right to
demand a jury trial in the first place. Thus, the plaintiff retained the
power to convert his claim at law back to an admiralty nonjury claim.25
On appeal, the defendant contended that once a jury trial had been
elected under Rule 9(h), the Seventh Amendment preserved it as a matter
of right.26 The seaman-plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that his initial
right to elect admiralty jurisdiction meant that he had the authority to
later revoke the demand for a jury trial by electing under Rule 9(h).27
Addressing the defendant’s argument, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has extended the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trials to areas uncontemplated at the time of the
framing of the Constitution—even to certain modern legal claims
mimicking equity.28 The Fifth Circuit explained, however, that the right
19 Id.; see Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (“A seaman . . . may elect to bring a
civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer.”). The applicable
rule of civil procedure states, in pertinent part:
If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction and also within the
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on some other ground, the pleading may designate the
claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), and 82 and
the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions.
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h)(1) (2012) [hereinafter Rule 9(h)].
20 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1212.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 600 F. Supp. 406, 407 (W.D. La. 1984).
24 Id.
25 See Rachal, 600 F. Supp. at 407; see also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines. Co., 374 U.S.
16, 21 (1963).
26 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1212 (citations omitted).
27 Id. at 1212–13.
28 Id. at 1213 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1970) (upholding the
right to jury trial in shareholder derivative suits once shareholders were given standing at
law to proceed for their recalcitrant corporations); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 478 (1962) (holding trademark infringement claims to be actions at law and
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to jury trial in a nondiversity case such as Rachal could arise only out of
the Jones Act’s statutory grant, because admiralty would not otherwise
recognize the right.29 The right is held by “the seaman, on proper
request.”30 By contrast, Rachal held that where a Jones Act plaintiff
pursues his claim in diversity under the federal admiralty jurisdiction
statute’s saving to suitors clause, both parties have an independent right
to jury trial.31
The Rachal court appeared to rely implicitly on its holding in
Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., in which a fourthparty defendant argued that simultaneous admiralty jurisdiction and
diversity jurisdiction over a products liability and negligence case
necessitated that it could demand a jury in diversity.32 The Harrison
court held that, even in a claim with multiple bases for jurisdiction, the
plaintiff “may preclude the defendant from invoking the right to trial by
jury which may otherwise exist” simply “by electing to proceed under
9(h) rather than by invoking diversity jurisdiction.”33 Implicitly relying
on Harrison, the Rachal court observed that, without a separate
jurisdictional basis such as diversity, the only thing giving rise to a jury
trial was the plaintiff’s election to proceed at law.34 Thus, Rachal
reasoned that the defendant’s ability to preserve a jury trial existed only
to the extent the rules of civil procedure might have prevented the
plaintiff “from withdrawing his jury demand.”35
In sum, because the Jones Act plaintiff was proceeding at law under
Jones Act-federal question jurisdiction, the Rachal court determined that
the text of the Jones Act gave the plaintiff—and the plaintiff alone—the

upholding the right to a jury trial even where the claim was pled as an “accounting”
between partners); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959)
(mandating that the trial of legal claims necessitating a jury precede the trial of equitable
nonjury claims)).
29 Id. (citing Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 19–21) (noting that joindered claims in admiralty
are tried together with Jones Act claims before a jury only as a matter of judicial
economy).
30 Id.; see 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (“A seaman . . . may elect to bring a civil action
at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer.”).
31 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213; see 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006) (giving federal district
courts exclusive jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled”)
(emphasis added).
32 577 F.2d 968, 986 (5th Cir. 1978); see Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213 (citing id.).
33 Harrison, 577 F.2d at 986; see Rule 9(h). By implication, the defendant would
have been able to demand a jury trial had the plaintiff not elected admiralty under Rule
9(h). See Harrison, 577 F.2d at 986.
34 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1214.
35 Id.
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right to a jury trial.36 By contrast, “[w]hen there is diversity jurisdiction .
. . both parties have an independent basis for a jury trial if the plaintiff
has chosen to pursue his Jones Act claim through the ‘saving to suitors’
clause in a civil action.”37
B. The Fifth Circuit Reinforces Rachal with Linton
In Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the Fifth Circuit
considered whether a Jones Act plaintiff’s election to proceed in state
court without a jury was proper.38 At the time, Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1732(6) afforded a maritime plaintiff suing in state
court under the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 the option of
forcing a nonjury trial.39 The defendant removed the case to federal
court, asserting that, by allowing a plaintiff to designate his state claim as
“admiralty or general maritime” and proceed without a jury, article
1732(6) was a constructive invocation of exclusive federal admiralty
jurisdiction.40 The district court, agreeing with the defendant, denied the
plaintiff’s motions to remand and reconsider under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),
based on improvident removal and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.41
The plaintiff appealed.42
With respect to the plaintiff’s Jones Act claim, the Fifth Circuit
opined that the “antecedent right implicit in” the Jones Act lies in
admiralty by virtue of the fact that plaintiffs may elect to proceed for
damages at law.43 Accordingly, the court summarized the defendant’s
argument about the plaintiff’s election power as asserting a distinction
between (1) the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court and

36 See id. at 1217 (ruling that “when the initial complaint was filed” under federal
question—not diversity— jurisdiction in federal court “and the plaintiff chose a civil
action” only the plaintiff retained the right to trial by jury); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2006) (outlining federal question subject matter jurisdiction).
37 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213.
38 964 F.2d 1480, 1482–84 (5th Cir. 1992).
39 LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1732(6) (1990) (“A trial by jury shall not be
available in . . . [a] suit on an admiralty or general maritime claim under federal law that
is brought in state court under a federal ‘saving to suitors’ clause, if the plaintiff has
designated that suit as an admiralty or general maritime claim.”). Louisiana has since
repealed this provision. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art 1732(6) (2012) (“A trial by jury
shall not be available in . . . [a]ll cases where a jury trial is specifically denied by law.”).
40 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1483.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1489; see Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (stating “the seaman may
elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury”); Panama R.R. Co. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924) (highlighting the choice between suing in admiralty or
suing at law with a “right of trial by jury”).

8

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

(2) an action at law, available in state or federal court, which “must be
tried to a jury.”44
Calling upon Rachal, the Linton court stated that the Jones Act’s
“right to an ‘action for damages at law’ protects the seaman’s ‘right of
trial by jury.’”45 Linton also recapitulated Rachal’’s distinction between
Jones Act nondiversity actions at law and Jones Act diversity actions at
law, granting the plaintiff the unilateral right to choose a jury or nonjury
trial in the former, while recognizing the right to a jury trial vested in
both parties in the latter.46 The Fifth Circuit observed that the
Constitution does not mandate, but merely permits, the invocation of the
right to a jury trial in an action at law.47 In light of Rachal’’s recognition
that defendants’ rights to a jury trial in federal court differ depending on
the underlying subject matter jurisdiction, Linton reasoned, by analogy,
that there must not be a constitutional bar to a right to a nonjury trial “if
state procedure allows it.”48
The Linton court also held that the saving to suitors clause permits
a nonjury trial at the state level if allowed by state procedure.49 The
court pointed out that the saving to suitors clause gives state courts
concurrent jurisdiction over all in personam claims seeking common law
remedies.50 So long as the state court is not “provid[ing] a remedy in
rem for a maritime cause of action,” or attempting to change federal
substantive admiralty law, permissible common law remedies include
equitable and statutory remedies as well as damages “enforceable in a
court of law.”51 Accordingly, the Linton court reasoned that:
[A] non-jury trial in state court is not, in and of itself, offensive to
the general maritime law. Furthermore, a statutory provision for a nonjury trial, in and of itself (absent any pretense at in rem proceedings),
does not constitute an attempt to create “an admiralty side of state court
which can have no constitutional foundation.”52
44 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1489–90. Note, here, the Linton court finds the defendant’s
assertion that a proceeding in state court through an at-law claim required a jury (versus
merely allowing one) to be incorrect. Id.
45 Id. at 1490 (quoting Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1213, 1215 (5th Cir.
1986)).
46 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490; see Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213–15, 1217.
47 See Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 1486–87 (citing Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 562, 564
(1954); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924)); see also The
Hine v. Trevor, 4 U.S. (Wall.) 555.
51 Id. at 1486 (quoting Madruga, 346 U.S. at 561; Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 124)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
52 Id. at 1487.
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In other words, the saving to suitors clause does not require a jury
trial for a remedy to fall within its purview.53
Linton also noted that just because the Louisiana statue referred to
the state court claims as “admiralty and maritime” did not mean such
words had converted what were actually civil in personam claims under
the purview of saving to suitors into bona fide federal admiralty claims.54
Linton, therefore, first reinforced the Rachal rule that nondiversity Jones
Act defendants do not have the right to a jury trial.55 It then provided
that a state may fashion its Jones Act remedies as it chooses so long as it
does not attempt to afford a true admiralty in rem remedy or contravene
federal substantive general maritime law.56
C. The Ninth Circuit’s View in Craig
The Ninth Circuit weighed in on the meaning of the Jones Act
plaintiff’s election power in Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co.57 In a Jones
Act wrongful death claim brought by William Craig’s estate, defendant
ARCO demanded a jury trial, which the plaintiff did not oppose.58 The
district court ruled that ARCO did not have the right to a trial by jury
and, after a bench trial, found for the defendant.59 Craig’s estate
appealed on the basis that ARCO had the right as the defendant to
demand a jury trial; that it was prejudicial error for the court to deny a
jury trial; and that, in the alternative, Craig was entitled to rely on the
demand anyway.60
Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in Rachal and Linton, the
Ninth Circuit held that, whereas the defendant has the right to demand a
jury when a separate basis for jurisdiction—such as diversity—exists,
only the plaintiff has a right to demand a jury trial when the sole basis for
jurisdiction is the Jones Act itself.61 Since there was no diversity
jurisdiction, ARCO, as the defendant, had no right to demand a jury trial

53

Linton, 964 F.2d at 1487.
Id. That is, the question of whether state law preserved the right to a jury trial or
right to a nonjury trial did not modify the subject matter jurisdiction of the claim. Id. at
1489.
55 See supra notes 36, 45–48 and accompanying text.
56 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
57 19 F.3d 472, 475–77 (9th Cir. 1994).
58 Id. at 474–75.
59 Id. at 475.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 475–76 (citing Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480,
1489 n.16 (5th Cir. 1992); Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1986)).
54
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under the Jones Act.62 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff
could rely on the defendant’s demand only if the defendant’s right to a
trial by jury had existed in the first place.63
D. Other Federal Courts Following the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
In Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., the Seventh Circuit impliedly
followed the Fifth Circuit’s view concerning the Jones Act plaintiff’s
election power by acknowledging that the plaintiff’s election of
jurisdiction in a Jones Act claim yields procedural results incident to
jurisdiction.64 The Seventh Circuit impliedly rejected the notion that a
Jones Act defendant has a substantive right to a jury trial.65 Likewise,
the Second Circuit, following the Ninth Circuit, broadly stated that the
Jones Act “provides seamen plaintiffs with powerful procedural rights,
such as the unilateral right to elect between jury and non-jury trial.”66
Federal district courts in various circuits have followed the same
reasoning, though not all agree.67
62 Id. at 476 (“The plain language of the Jones Act gives a plaintiff the option of
maintaining an action at law with the accompanying right to a jury trial. The Act makes
no mention of a defendant.”).
63 Craig, 19 F.3d at 476–77
64 185 F.3d 657, 665–68 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1998).
65 Id. at 671. The court’s implication that the Jones Act defendant has no substantive
jury trial right is subtle. In a footnote of the opinion, the court asserted that it was not
addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim because it did not retain jurisdiction. See
id. at 671 n.9. Nevertheless, the court expressly stated, “Although it is true that the
consequence of allowing the Third Amended Complaint to be filed was that the case was
designated as one in admiralty and that it would therefore proceed to a bench trial rather
than a jury trial, that consequence is irrelevant for our purposes.” Id. at 671. The court
also stated, “Orders which do not determine parties’ substantive rights or liabilities,
however, are not appealable . . . even if those orders have important procedural
consequences.” Id. (quoting Ingram Towing Co. v. ADNAC, Inc., 59 F.3d 513, 517 (5th
Cir. 1995)). Thus, in order to hold that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the appeal or
the merits of the case, the Wingerter court necessarily implied that the defendant’s loss of
the jury trial was a procedural issue, not a substantive one. See id.
66 Harrington v. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 133 & n.7 (2d Cir. 2010).
67 Compare Quinn Constr., Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., No. CIV.A. 07-406,
2010 WL 4909587 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2010), Adams v. James Transp., LLC, No. 5:09CV-00036-R, 2010 WL 4789290, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 16, 2010) (“Only a plaintiff may
assert the right to a jury trial under the Jones Act.”), and Ferdinand v. Cnty. of Nassau,
No. CV 02-4024, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18272, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004) (“Under
the Jones Act, the plaintiff, but not the defendant, had a right to demand a jury
trial . . . .”), with Abbott v. Bragdon, 893 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D. Me. 1995) (misreading
Rachal as support for the notion that a defendant in a Jones Act case has a constitutional
right to jury trial once the plaintiff has elected to proceed at law), and In re Armatur,
S.A., 710 F. Supp. 404, 406 (D.P.R. 1989) (“[O]nce a plaintiff has demanded a jury . . .
he cannot subsequently withdraw the jury demand and designate his claim as one in
admiralty, without abiding by Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a), which requires all parties to stipulate to
the withdrawal of a jury demand.”).
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E. Louisiana’s View
Relying upon Rachal’s assessment of Jones Act claims pled under
statutory jurisdiction rather than diversity, Louisiana followed the Fifth
Circuit in its own opinion about the plaintiff’s election power, holding
that “plaintiffs alone have control over whether the case is to be tried to a
judge or a jury.”68 According to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
“[P]laintiffs may choose to have the entire case tried to a jury, or may
withdraw the jury demand.”69 By implication, the plaintiff retains the
power to determine whether or not a jury hears the case.70
The court in Parker v. Rowan Companies, Inc. also explained that
state courts have the power to hear Jones Act claims both through the
statute’s own jurisdictional grant as civil actions at law and as claims in
admiralty.71 Like in personam claims in admiralty, Jones Act claims are
cognizable in state court actions under the saving to suitors clause under
Parker.72 Parker thus independently reached the same conclusion as
Linton, namely that “it is within the province of the states to establish
their own rules for the availability of jury trials” and a “denial of a jury
trial in a state court” Jones Act claim by state court procedure is valid.73
F. California’s View
It is technically incorrect to say that California has ruled on this
subject, as its leading case with respect to the plaintiff’s election power is
an unpublished opinion.74 Still, Peters v. City and County of San
Francisco is instructive because it outlines the state court’s
understanding of federal jurisprudence on the matter.75 (There was also
published support for the same view in Illinois state courts before the
Illinois Supreme Court overruled it, so the interpretation is one that can
and has percolated elsewhere.76) Plaintiff Peters sued the City of San
68

Parker v. Rowan Cos., Inc., 599 So. 2d 296, 299 (La. 1992).
Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
70 See id. at 299.
71 Id. at 299–301 (citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 388–89 (1924)).
72 Id. at 300–01 (citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 559–60 (1926)).
73 Id. at 301; accord Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480,
1486–87 (5th Cir. 1992); see supra part II(B).
74 Peters v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 1995 AMC 788 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14,
1994).
75 See id. at 792; Roy Dripps, The Seaman’s “Election” Under the Jones Act: A
Reply to Professors Robertson and Sturley, 14 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 127, 134 (2001)
(acknowledging Peters’s importance as demonstrative of this particular strain of
interpretation).
76 Allen v. Norman Bros., Inc., 678 N.E.2d 317, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (calling
Jones Act jury rights a matter of substantive federal law and reversing a trial court’s
refusal to strike the defendant’s jury demand), overruled by Bowman v. Am. River
69
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Francisco under the Jones Act after injuring his arm while lashing two
barges together in preparation for a fireworks display commemorating
the fiftieth anniversary of the Golden Gate Bridge.77 Peters originally
demanded a jury but later waived his right.78 The city then demanded a
trial by jury, which the lower court denied.79
On appeal, the Peters court acknowledged the Jones Act plaintiff’s
election power under federal law, namely, that a seaman may sue in “an
action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury.”80 The city
argued that Peters’s election of a remedy at law in state court required a
jury trial.81 The court responded by asserting that Linton “rejected the
specific contention that if a Jones Act or maritime case is to be tried in
state court, it must be tried to a jury.”82
The city also argued that it retained an independent right to a jury
trial.83 The court, however, pointed out that the Jones Act incorporates
the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) by reference and that
FELA cases guide Jones Act jurisprudence.84 The Peters court also
noted that federal maritime law governs the parties’ substantive rights
while state law governs procedure.85 Because both the Supreme Court of
the United States and the California Supreme Court previously had ruled
that the right to trial by jury is a substantive right under FELA, the Peters
court reasoned the same must be true under the Jones Act.86
Accordingly, the Peters court determined that the right to a jury trial
under the Jones Act was a substantive right and held that federal law
should control.87
Peters adopted—as substantive law applicable to every Jones Act
case in any forum—Rachal’s holding that federal law provides only the
plaintiff, not the defendant, with the right to trial by jury.88 Peters
considered the Jones Act plaintiff’s unilateral right to elect a jury so
Transp. Co., 838 N.E.2d 949, 962 (Ill. 2005) (upholding the defendant’s Jones Act jury
trial right); see infra notes 84–90 and accompanying text; infra Part II(G).
77 Peters, 1995 AMC at 788–89.
78 Id. at 790.
79 Id. at 789–90.
80 Id. at 790.
81 Id. at 791.
82 Id. (citing Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1485, 1488–
90 (5th Cir. 1992)).
83 Peters, 1995 AMC at 791.
84 Id.
85 Id. (citing Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335 (1988); Jehl v.
Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 833 (1967)).
86 Id. at 791–92 (citing Monessen, 486 U.S. at 336; Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952); Jehl, 66 Cal. 2d at 833).
87 Id. at 792.
88 Id. (citing Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1212, 1215–16 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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significant that it held the plaintiff had the right to a nonjury trial
notwithstanding the California Constitution’s guarantee of a jury right in
all trials.89 Thus, Peters relied upon Linton for the proposition that
federal law guarantees only the Jones Act plaintiff the choice between a
jury or nonjury trial in an action at law in state court, and upon Rachal
and FELA jurisprudence for the notion that this right is substantive.90
G. Illinois’s Rejection of Rachal and Craig
Until the Illinois Supreme Court opined on the matter in Bowman v.
American River Transport Co., Illinois appellate courts were split over
the issue of the plaintiff’s election power.91 In Bowman, the plaintiff
filed a Jones Act negligence claim against his employer, and the
defendants demanded a jury trial.92 Upon motion by the plaintiff, the
court struck the jury demand.93 After judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
the defendants appealed in part, asserting a right to a jury trial in Jones
Act cases.94
The Bowman court began by noting that the saving to suitors clause
of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 confers concurrent jurisdiction of admiralty and
maritime claims on state courts and preserves state remedies.95 The court
also derived five distinct propositions from the Supreme Court’s decision
in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson: (1) the injured seaman’s negligence
action may lie in admiralty; (2) alternatively, the action may lie on the
basis of general federal question and statutory jurisdiction; (3) it is the
saving to suitors clause that allows general federal and statutory
jurisdiction to lie in lieu of admiralty; (4) the saving to suitors clause
89 Peters, 1995 AMC at 792 (“The state constitutional right to jury trial does not
apply, because the right to a jury trial is an issue of substantive law that turns on federal
law alone.”). Contra CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
90 See supra Part II(B); supra notes 74–89 and accompanying text.
91 See 838 N.E.2d 949, 962 (Ill. 2005) (upholding the defendant’s Jones Act jury trial
right). Compare Hendricks v. Riverway Harbor St. Louis, Inc., 732 N.E.2d 757, 765 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000) (following Allen), Hearn v. Am. River Transp., 707 N.E.2d 1283, 1289
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (upholding the court’s previous Allen jurisprudence), Hanks v. Luhr
Bros., Inc., 707 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (following Allen and denying the
Jones Act defendant the right to trial by jury), Gibbs v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 700
N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (upholding the rule that only the plaintiff has the
right to jury trial in Jones Act claims), and Allen, 678 N.E.2d at 318–21 (reasoning that
federal law mandates that Jones Act defendants have no right to a jury trial and applying
the same rule to Illinois), with Hutton v. Consol. Grain & Barge Co., 795 N.E.2d 303,
307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (disagreeing with Allen and giving the right to the Jones Act
defendant to a jury trial).
92 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 951.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 952 (citing Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001)).
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provides ipso facto that Jones Act suits may proceed under federal
diversity jurisdiction or even in state court; and (5) Jones Act cases lie in
admiralty when the plaintiff characterizes them as such in federal court.96
The Illinois Supreme Court further cited Johnson for the crucial
proposition that “[w]hen Jones Act Cases are brought on any other
jurisdictional basis [than admiralty], whether in state court or on the law
side of federal court, they, like other saving-clause cases, are deemed to
be cases at common law.”97
The Bowman court then analyzed the statutory construction of the
language of the Jones Act.98 The court quoted a previous version of the
Act, which stated: “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for
damages at law, with the right of trial by jury.”99 The court then stated:
We believe that anyone well versed in statutory construction, or
even English grammar, would find the plain language of that
sentence clearly states that the “election” to be made by the seaman
pertains to his choice to maintain an action “at law,” and not his
election of a “right of trial by jury.” Under the principle of
statutory construction known as the last antecedent doctrine,
relative or qualifying words or phrases in a statute serve only to
modify words or phrases which are immediately preceding and do
not modify those which are more remote.100
The court noted that the Jones Act did not specifically grant the
plaintiff unilateral control over the right to trial by jury per se.101 Rather,
the court concluded, “[T]he rules of statutory construction clearly
establish that the ‘election’ referred to in the Jones Act is not the
seaman’s election of a trial by jury, but his election to proceed ‘at law’
rather than in admiralty,” i.e., the plaintiff’s choice pertains to
jurisdiction, not the mode of trial.102
The Bowman court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Panama
Railroad Co. v. Vasquez for the proposition that there exists a distinction
between the substantive rights of the Jones Act plaintiff, namely, the
96

Id. at 953 (citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 382–85 (1924)).
Id. (citing Johnson, 264 U.S. at 382, 388, 391).
98 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 953.
99 Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. app § 688(a) (2000) (emphasis added)). The operative
phrase in the updated language is virtually identical. Compare 46 U.S.C. App. § 688(a)
(2000), with 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (“A seaman injured in the course of employment .
. . may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the
employer.”) (emphasis added).
100 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 953.
101 Id. at 954.
102 Id.
97
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right to sue in negligence to seek damages, and the procedural guarantees
incident to whichever form of jurisdiction the plaintiff might invoke.103
The plaintiff’s election power, according to Bowman, is a choice between
a suit “at law, with the attendant right to a trial by jury” and a suit “in
admiralty, where there is no right to trial by jury.”104
Accordingly, Bowman ascertained that the “varying measures of
redress” and “different forms of action” described in Johnson reflect a
choice between law and admiralty, not a direct choice between jury and
nonjury trials.105 The Bowman court reasoned that, because Johnson’s
purpose was to determine the constitutionality of the Jones Act, its focus
was on whether a new maritime cause of action could arise out of or in
addition to the substantive rights already inherent in the general maritime
law, without depriving the Supreme Court of its constitutional admiralty
jurisdiction.106 To wit:
Johnson in its entirety shows that the “forms of action” choice . . .
refers to admiralty actions versus at-law negligence actions. We
can find nothing . . . which suggests that the term “forms of action”
could have been intended to refer to a choice between jury and
nonjury trials in common law actions. Indeed, the jury trial is
explicitly referred to “as an incident” of the choice “to proceed on
the common law side of the court.”107
The Bowman court rejected the notion that the plaintiff’s election
power gives a seaman the unilateral right to elect a jury or nonjury trial
in an action at law.108
The court also rejected the idea that a jury trial is a substantive right
inherent in the Jones Act.109 The plaintiff argued that federal substantive
law, not state procedural law, should govern the demand for jury trials,
because the Jones Act incorporates FELA by reference and Dice v.
Akron, Canton and Youngstown Railroad Co., a United States Supreme
Court decision, held that a jury trial in FELA cases is a substantive
right.110 The Bowman court rejected this argument, pointing out that
even if the jury trial right in Jones Act cases is guaranteed through Dice,
103

See id. at 955 (citing 271 U.S. 557, 560 (1926)).
Id. (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 955–56 (quoting Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 392 (1924)).
106 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 956.
107 Id. (quoting Johnson, 264 U.S. at 391).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 958. But cf. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359,
363 (1952) (holding the right to a jury trial in FELA cases to be a substantive right).
110 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 958. But cf. Peters v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 1995
AMC 788, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 1994); see supra notes 83–90 and accompanying
text.
104
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it does not necessarily follow that there exists a plaintiff’s right to a
nonjury trial.111
Ultimately, the Bowman court concluded that “the availability of a
jury trial in Jones Act cases is a question that is properly controlled by
the normal laws of the forum.”112 Determining that jury trials in state
court are a matter of state law, the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed its
own state constitution and held that it guarantees the right to a jury trial
in Jones Act claims to both parties.113 The court expressly rejected
Rachal’s interpretation that only the plaintiff has the right to demand or
strike the demand for a jury in federal court once the plaintiff designates
the claim’s subject matter jurisdiction to be at law.114 Notably, this
placed Illinois in conflict with the circuit in which it sits, the Seventh
Circuit, which impliedly followed the Fifth Circuit and rejected the
notion that a Jones Act defendant could demand a jury trial.115
III. ENDICOTT V. ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC.
As in all Jones Act claims, the seaman in Endicott suffered an
injury while working for his employer.116 After a fish cart crushed Justin
Endicott’s arm, he sued Icicle Seafoods in Washington State Superior
Court under the Jones Act and a general maritime law claim of
unseaworthiness.117 Endicott moved to strike Icicle Seafood’s demand
for a jury trial, and the trial court granted Endicott’s motion.118 After a
bench trial, the court awarded Endicott damages, and Icicle Seafoods
appealed on several issues, including an assertion to the right to a jury
trial.119
The Washington Supreme Court first noted that the saving to
suitors clause gives maritime plaintiffs the right to sue in state court
provided the causes of action are in personam and not in rem.120 Reading
111

Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 959.
Id.
113 Id. at 959–62.
114 Id. at 957. At least two federal district courts agree. Abbott v. Bragdon, 893 F.
Supp. 99, 101 (D. Me. 1995) (misreading Rachal as support for the notion that a
defendant in a Jones Act case has a constitutional right to jury trial once the plaintiff has
elected to proceed at law); In re Armatur, S.A., 710 F. Supp. 404, 406 (D.P.R. 1989)
(“[O]nce a plaintiff has demanded a jury . . . he cannot subsequently withdraw the jury
demand and designate his claim as one in admiralty, while abiding by Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a),
which requires all parties to stipulate to the withdrawal of a jury demand.”).
115 Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 665–68 & n.5, 671 (7th Cir.
1998); see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
116 Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 224 P.3d 761, 763 (Wash. 2010).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 763–64.
120 Id. at 764.
112
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the text of the original Jones Act closely and impliedly interpreting the
word “elect” as redundant, the Washington Supreme Court stated, “By its
terms, the Jones Act allows seamen to sue at law, but not in admiralty, to
recover for their employers’ negligence.”121 Endicott noted that the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson was a
thinly veiled way of saving the Act from unconstitutionality.122 Because
the Act otherwise carved out a negligence action from the Court’s
admiralty purview, the Johnson court had read into the Act the plaintiff’s
choice to sue at law or in admiralty.123 The Endicott court stated that
Johnson left ambiguous whether the plaintiff’s power to “elect between .
. . different forms of action” is a statutory right to elect the mode of trial
(jury vs. nonjury) or whether it is the right to select the jurisdictional
basis of trial (at law vs. in admiralty). If the latter, the jury trial right
flows procedurally from the choice of jurisdiction."124
The court further recognized a “split among federal and state courts
as to which interpretation of Johnson is correct” but mischaracterized the
divide as “the Ninth Circuit and California on one side and the Fifth
Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Louisiana, and Illinois on the other.”125
Because the Ninth Circuit in Craig specifically had stated that
“[t]he [Jones] Act makes no mention of a defendant,” Endicott
summarized Craig as using “exclusio alterius reasoning to conclude that
the defendant in a nondiversity Jones Act suit filed in federal court has
no right to demand a jury trial.”126 The Endicott court then stated that the
California appellate court’s unpublished Peters decision “adopts
reasoning like Craig’s in the state court-context, denying the defendant a
jury trial right in a Jones Act and general maritime suit filed in state court
under the saving to suitors clause.”127
Next, the Washington Supreme Court, assenting to the Defendant’s
characterization of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ opinions as
“‘jurisdictional’ position[s],” noted that a “Jones Act election is limited
to choosing the jurisdictional basis of trial (in admiralty vs. at law) and
that jury rights flow from this election as procedural incidents.”128
121 See id. (focusing on the holistic meaning of the Jones Act clause “may . . . bring a
civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury”).
122 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 764–65.
123 Id. at 765 (citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924)).
124 Id.
125 See id. at 765; supra Part II.
126 Id. at 765 (quoting Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir.
1994)); see supra Part II(C).
127 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765 (emphasis added); see supra Part II(F).
128 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765 (quoting Johnson, 264 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he injured
seaman is permitted, but not required, to proceed on the common law side of the court
with a trial by jury as an incident.”)(emphasis added)); id. (“Federal case law interpreting
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Endicott believed the Ninth Circuit had misread Rachal and Linton and,
therefore, sided with the Fifth Circuit view upholding the “jurisdictional”
position.129
Endicott continued its analysis with Panama Railroad Co. v.
Vasquez, noting that the Supreme Court there had decided the saving to
suitors clause allows Jones Act plaintiffs to bring their in personam
maritime claims at law with the right to jury trial or in admiralty without
trial by jury.130 Endicott viewed Vasquez as upholding the jurisdictional
interpretation of the Jones Act, because the Supreme Court had
distinguished between suits at law and suits in admiralty with “the jury
trial right as an incident following from this distinction.”131 The
Washington Supreme Court saw the “progression of federal cases” as
“reinforc[ing] this interpretation.”132
The Endicott court then observed that both Louisiana and Illinois
(through Bowman) had adhered to the jurisdictional analysis of the
plaintiff’s election power and that state procedural law should determine
whether a plaintiff or defendant has the right to demand a trial by jury (or
vice versa) in state court.133 The court stated definitively:
We find the analysis in Bowman persuasive. The Jones Act affords
the plaintiff the right to elect only the jurisdictional basis for his
suit. Once the plaintiff makes his choice of jurisdiction, procedural
rights flow as normal incidents of the suit. This means that there is
no substantive federal right to elect the mode of trial directly.
Rather, state procedural law determines whether the parties have a
right to a jury trial.134
Finally, Endicott queried whether the Washington Constitution
guarantees the right to trial by jury in Jones Act claims.135 The court
recognized that the Washington Constitution guarantees the right to a
the Jones Act convinces us that the jurisdictional interpretation is correct.”); see supra
Part II(A), (B), (D).
129 See Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765–66.
130 Id. at 766 (quoting Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 560 (1926) (“[T]he
new substantive rights may be asserted and enforced either in actions in personam against
the employers in courts administering common-law remedies, with a right of trial by jury,
or in suits in admiralty in courts administering remedies in admiralty, without trial by
jury . . . .”)).
131 Id.
132 Id. (citing Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 665–68 & n.5 (7th Cir.
1998); Tex. Menhaden Co. v. Palermo, 329 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1964); McAfoos v.
Canadian Pac. S.S., Ltd., 243 F.2d 270, 272, 274 (2d Cir. 1957); Williams v. Tide Water
Associated Oil Co., 227 F.2d 791, 793–94 (9th Cir. 1955); McCarthy v. Am. E. Corp.
175 F2.d 724, 726 (3d Cir. 1949)).
133 Id. at 766–67.
134 Id. at 767.
135 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 767.
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jury trial in any cause of action at law that existed, or is analogous to one
that existed, at the time of statehood.136 According to the court, the Jones
Act cause of action is rooted in negligence and, therefore, is analogous to
the common law claims recognized in Washington as of 1889.137
Accordingly, the Endicott court ruled that the Washington Constitution
confers the right to a jury trial to both Jones Act parties.138 The court
subsequently vacated the judgment and remanded for jury trial.139
IV. ANALYSIS
A. A Summary of the Three Views of the Jones Act Jury Trial Right
Federal court jurisprudence, as well as that of Louisiana, California,
and Illinois, suggests there are actually three distinct judicial views
regarding the right to a jury trial under the Jones Act.140 For clarity, the
operative text of the Jones Act is restated here: “A seaman injured in the
course of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal
representative of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with
the right of trial by jury, against the employer.”141
1. Rachal-Linton
The first view, which one might call the Rachal-Linton view,
interprets the Jones Act plaintiff’s power to “elect to bring a civil action
at law, with the right of trial by jury,” to be a jurisdictional choice
between a suit in admiralty and a suit at law.142 Yet, whether or not a
trial proceeds before a jury or judge is incident to this first jurisdictional
choice.143 If the plaintiff chooses to proceed in admiralty in federal
court, there naturally is no jury trial.144 If, however, the plaintiff chooses
to proceed at law, he may face a second choice: he may file either in
federal court under a non-admiralty grant of subject matter jurisdiction or
in state court under the saving to suitors clause.145 If the claim proceeds
136

Id.
Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See supra Part II; infra Part IV(A)(1)–(3).
141 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (emphasis added).
142 Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 29–
34 and accompanying text.
143 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1214, 1217; see supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h), 38(e); see Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1214; see also Fitzgerald v.
U.S. Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963); Waring v. Clarke, 5 U.S. (How.) 441, 460 (1847).
145 Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1483 (5th Cir. 1992);
see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
137
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in state court, state procedural law governs whether and for whom the
right to trial by jury exists and how a party secures it.146
If, on the other hand, the claim at law proceeds in federal court,
there is yet a third bifurcation: claims that proceed at law in diversity
give both parties the simultaneous right to demand and retain a jury.147
Claims that proceed at law solely under general federal question
jurisdiction and the Jones Act’s statutory language allow only the
plaintiff to elect whether to proceed with a jury.148 As a trial by jury can
only arise conditionally out of the plaintiff’s unilateral power to choose
federal question jurisdiction, the Rachal-Linton view recognizes the right
to trial by jury as something the plaintiff can opt out of later because the
plaintiff had the power to opt into it at the outset.149 Thus, when the
claim is not in diversity, the Rachal-Linton view collapses jurisdiction
and mode of trial into one question.150 The nondiversity federal
defendant can neither demand a jury trial nor retain a jury trial if the
plaintiff moves to strike his own or the defendant’s previous jury
demand.151
2. Bowman
The second view, espoused by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Bowman, agrees with the Rachal-Linton view regarding the nature of the
plaintiff’s election power: it is a choice between jurisdictional bases,
admiralty or law, for Jones Act claims.152 At law, the plaintiff may sue
in state or federal court.153 If he sues in state court, state procedure
governs the right to a jury trial.154 According to Bowman, however, the
Fifth Circuit’s distinction between diversity and nondiversity Jones Act
cases is incorrect.155 In all federal Jones Act cases proceeding at law, the

146

Linton, 964 F.2d at 1487, 1490; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Linton, 964 F.2d at 1489 n.16; Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213; see supra notes 50–54,
56 and accompanying text.
148 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490; Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213–15, 1217; see supra notes 45–
47 and accompanying text.
149 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1217; see supra notes 36, 46–47, 55, 142 and accompanying
text.
150 See sources cited supra note 149.
151 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213–15, 1217; see Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490; supra notes 45–
47 and accompanying text.
152 Bowman v. Am. River Transp. Co., 838 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ill. 2005); see supra
notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
153 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 952–53; see supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
154 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 959–62; see supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
155 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 953–59; see supra notes 98–111 and accompanying text.
147
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Bowman doctrine holds that either the plaintiff or the defendant has the
right to demand and preserve trial by jury.156
3. Peters
Under the third view, espoused in California’s unpublished Peters
opinion, instead of reading “with the right of trial by jury” as an indicator
of a Jones Act claim’s jurisdiction at law, the court conflates the right of
trial by jury with the plaintiff’s election power.157 Thus, when cases are
tried at law—in state or in federal court—only the plaintiff may decide
whether or not a jury may hear his claims, even if this choice overrides
otherwise valid state procedural guarantees to jury trials.158
B. Evaluation of Rachal-Linton:
The Plaintiff Gave and the Plaintiff Hath Taken Away159
The conflicts between these views of the right to jury trial in Jones
Act cases really are not about whether the plaintiff has the right to
control the mode of trial.160 The plaintiff unquestionably has the right to
determine at the outset whether he and the defendant will try their case to
the bench or to a jury, especially considering the Jones Act gives him the
right to designate his claim in admiralty or at law.161 To the extent the
law allows the plaintiff to make the choice between state and federal
court—or, in federal court, between admiralty and a claim at law—the
plaintiff is the master of his complaint.162 He controls the subject matter
jurisdiction and the forum.163
The split of authority, rather, is about whether the Jones Act gives
the plaintiff so much control of the case that he could unilaterally redesignate his case from law (with an attendant right to trial by jury) to
156

Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 957; see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
Peters v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 1995 AMC 788, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
14, 1994); see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
158 Peters, 1995 A.M.C. at 791–92; see supra note 89 and accompanying text. Contra
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
159 Cf. Job 1:21.
160 See David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Jones
Act Cases: Choosing the Forum Versus Choosing the Procedure, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM.
649, 650 (1999).
161 See Rule 9(h) (giving procedural life to the plaintiff’s election power); Panama
R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924) (creating the plaintiff’s election power);
Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 669–70 (acknowledging the plaintiff’s power is
de facto).
162 See Rule 9(h); Johnson, 264 U.S. at 391; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386, 392 (1987) (acknowledging that the plaintiff has the power to confer federal
jurisdiction vel non with a well-pleaded complaint and is the “master of [his] claim”).
163 See sources cited supra note 162.
157
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admiralty without the consent of the defendant.164 Cynically speaking,
does the plaintiff have the right to designate a claim at law so as to
garner the right to trial by jury, but also to later convert his claim to
admiralty when he discovers the identity of the assigned judge and
believes the bench in admiralty might be more favorable to his claim?165
The generic plaintiff already exercises significant control when it
comes to finding a forum favorable to his claim.166 The Constitution
notwithstanding, it would not be entirely surprising had Congress
intended for the Jones Act plaintiff—a seafarer and ward of the courts of
admiralty—to be able to control trial to such an extent that he could
convert a jury trial into a nonjury trial.167 But the crux of the issue,
really, is whether such a view comports with the Seventh Amendment
guarantee of the right to jury trials at law.168 It does not.169
1. Constitutional and Textual Problems in Rachal
The Seventh Amendment has never protected the right to trial by
jury in admiralty, but it has always protected the right to jury trial in
claims at law.170 Furthermore, “the right to trial by jury” is a term of art
that contemplates the rights of both the plaintiff and the defendant to
demand or retain a jury.171 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39

164

See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 650.
See id. (laying out Jones Act plaintiffs’ filing strategies to ensure the most
favorable forum for adjudication of their claims).
166 See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392 (cognizing the plaintiff’s ability to determine
jurisdiction and forum on the face of the complaint).
167 See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 529 (1938) (explaining the
“liberality with which admiralty courts have traditionally interpreted rule devised for the
benefit and protection of seamen who are its wards”); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275, 287 (1897) (explicating the admiralty courts’ view that seaman are presumed to be
deficient in their abilities to look after themselves and that the admiralty courts are their
guardians). The Court saw admiralty courts “‘quemadmodum pater in filios, magister in
discipulos, dominus in servos vel familiares.’” Robertson, 165 at 287. This translates to
“as a father to a child, a master to a disciple, [or] the lord of the household servants.” See
GOOGLE TRANSLATE, http://translate.google.com/ (select “Latin” from the left dropdown
box, enter the phrase in the first textbox, select “English” from the right dropdown box,
and read Google’s translation in the right textbox) (last visited November 18, 2012).
168 See infra Part IV(B)(1).
169 See infra Part IV(B)(1).
170 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41–42 (1989); Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 193–94 (1974); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446–47 (1830).
171 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192 (“[T]he Seventh Amendment entitles either party to
demand a jury trial in an action for damages in the federal courts . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 345 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“If a jury would have been empaneled in a particular kind of case in 1791,
then the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial today, if either party so desires.”
(emphasis added)).
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acknowledge and implement this right.172 Once a jury is demanded,
neither party, generally speaking, can unilaterally revoke or strike the
demand.173 Constitutionally speaking, why would and how could the
Jones Act be any different?174
The Jones Act was Congress’s second attempt at enacting a
negligence cause of action for seamen in light of the Supreme Court’s
holdings in The Osceola.175 The Osceola had articulated, along with two
other principles, the following two bars to negligence claims under the
general maritime law:
3. . . . [A]ll the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master,
are, as between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen
cannot recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of
another member of the crew beyond the expense of his maintenance
and cure . . . .
4. . . . [T]he seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the
negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled
to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received by
negligence or accident.176
Congress responded by passing “[a]n Act [t]o promote the welfare
of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States,” which
included a section stating “[t]hat in any suit to recover damages for any
injury sustained on board [a] vessel or in its service seamen having
command shall not be held to be fellow-servants with those under their
authority.”177
It appears Congress latched onto The Osceola’s
prevarication in the third principle regarding whether seamen were
“fellow servants” of their master by purporting to allow a seaman to sue
for negligence caused by the “seam[a]n having command.”178
The Supreme Court struck down Congress’s response in Chelentis
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., holding (a) that even if the case were pursued
outside of admiralty under the saving to suitors clause, maritime law, and
172

FED. R. CIV. P. 38, 39 (2012) [hereinafter Rule 38 and Rule 39].
Id. at Rule 38(a), (b), (d); id. at Rule 39(a) (allowing the parties to stipulate
together to waive the jury once demanded or requiring a party to seek leave of the court
upon motion).
174 See infra notes 176–215 and accompanying text; see also Robertson & Sturley,
supra note 160, at 666–69 (arguing for why there is no difference).
175 GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-20, at
325–27 (2d ed. 1975); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 3, at 233–34.
176 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) (emphases added).
177 Act to Promote the Welfare of American Seamen in the Merchant Marine of the
United States, Pub. L. No. 63-302, § 20, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185 (1915) (emphasis added);
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 173, § 6-20, at 325; Robertson & Sturley, supra note 3, at
234. Compare § 20, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185, with The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175.
178 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 175, § 6-20, at 325.
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not the common law, applied; and (b) that maritime law does not
consider negligence when providing a remedy.179 Chelentis called
Congress’s act “irrelevant,” because whether or not a “seam[a]n having
command” acted negligently, the fourth principle—namely, that the
“seaman is not allowed to recover . . . for the negligence of the
master”—controlled.180 Furthermore, in the midst of its discussion about
whether maritime law or the common law applied, Chelentis emphasized
the differences between rights and remedies, noting that the saving to
suitors clause for general maritime law claims employs common law
remedies to enforce maritime rights.181 That is, in a saving to suitors
case, jury trials and common law standards for liability govern the
maritime cause of action.182
Thus, Congress redoubled by passing the Jones Act.183 The original
language of the Act elucidates Congress’s intent:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United
States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases
of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the
death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at
law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the
case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such

179

247 U.S. 372, 383–85 (1918); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 173, § 6-20, at 326.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 175, § 6-20, at 326; see Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384;
see also The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175 (espousing the fellow servant doctrine, except
perhaps as to the master of the vessel, yet rejecting a seaman’s cause of action for the
negligence of any crew member, including the master). Gilmore and Black seemed to
posit that no one ever figured out why Congress declined to directly address The
Osceola’s fourth point:
By those few lines the Congress apparently intended to change the maritime law as stated
in The Osceola under which an injured seaman . . . could not recover damages for
negligence of master or crew in the navigation or management of the ship. At least, if
that was not the intention, no one has ever been able to suggest what the intention was.
See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 175, § 6-20, at 325.
181 Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 383–84 (“The distinction between rights and remedies is
fundamental . . . . [W]e think, under the saving clause a right sanctioned by the maritime
law may be enforced through any appropriate remedy recognized at common law.”).
182 Id. at 379, 382–83.
183 GRANT & GILMORE, supra note 175, § 6-20, at 326 (noting, whimsically, that the
Court “goaded Congress into doing it the hard way”); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 3,
at 234.
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actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located.184
By expressly extending FELA’s “common-law right or remedy” to
this new cause of action, in conjunction with a slew of terms of art that
signaled an action at common law, Congress made clear it was creating a
common law negligence action enforceable in common law courts as
opposed to a maritime remedy.185
In context, Congress placed the right to trial by jury in the text as a
descriptor of the sailor’s election to “maintain an action for damages at
law” (currently: “bring a civil action at law”) so that it would be evident
to the Supreme Court that the Jones Act was not infringing on the
Court’s constitutionally-provided, original admiralty jurisdiction over the
general maritime law.186 Congress was not modifying the general
maritime law’s prohibition of negligence causes of action per se.187
Consequently, it is very unlikely that Congress envisioned the plaintiff
controlling the right to trial by jury vel non in a legal cause of action
analogous to negligence on land, subject—like any other action at law—
to the Seventh Amendment.188 In any similar action at law, either the
plaintiff or the defendant could demand a jury.189
Upon review, the Supreme Court asserted a potential conflict
anyway: the Johnson Court entertained the strawman that Congress was
attempting to “carve out” a cause of action from the general maritime
law.190 Yet, to avoid declaring unconstitutional Congress’s negligencefor-seamen cause of action after previously having done exactly that, the
Court deftly held that Congress intended for Jones Act plaintiffs to be
able to choose between suits at law and admiralty.191
Thus, it was the Supreme Court that created the plaintiff’s election
power, a jurisdictional choice between law and admiralty for Jones Act
plaintiffs—the one reflected in Rule 9(h) today.192 The text of Johnson
illustrates this character of the election by noting that further rights, such
as the right to a jury trial, are “incident” to the jurisdictional basis of a

184

The Jones Act, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (emphasis added).
Compare id. (“common-law right or remedy”), with Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 383 (“It
is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.”),
and The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866) (saying the same).
186 See sources cited supra note 185.
187 See sources cited supra note 185.
188 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (recognizing the right for either
party in an action at law to demand a jury trial).
189 See id.
190 See Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 387–90 (1924).
191 Id. at 388–89.
192 Id.; accord Rule 9(h).
185
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Jones Act plaintiff’s claim.193 On this point, the Fifth Circuit, Ninth
Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Illinois Supreme Court and Washington
Supreme Court all agree that the right to trial by jury is incident to the
jurisdictional election of the plaintiff.194 Only California disagrees (or
may disagree given that Peters was an unpublished intermediate
appellate level case).195
The Court may have interpreted the Jones Act in a way that
preserved admiralty jurisdiction, but nothing in Johnson indicates the
Court was taking the extraordinary step of modifying the bilateral
meaning of right to trial by jury once a Jones Act plaintiff has made his
election at law, either in diversity or under federal question
jurisdiction.196 Before Rachal, the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Penrod
Drilling recognized precisely that there was no such distinction.197
The Penrod court held that the trial court had deprived the
defendant of his right to trial by jury by allowing the plaintiffs to redesignate their claim as one in admiralty under Rule 9(h) after the
defendant already had designated the claim at law and demanded a
jury.198 The court articulated the issue as whether “the plaintiffs, through
the device of amending their complaints to state admiralty and maritime
claims under Rule 9(h), effectively withdr[e]w their demands for jury
trials without compliance with the specific procedures set forth in Rule
39(a) . . . .”199 Penrod answered in the negative, citing the Seventh
Amendment.200
Rachal, therefore, diametrically departed from the Fifth Circuit’s
previous jurisprudence.201 Why Rachal did this is speculative, but the
illuminating question is: how?202 Rachal distinguished Penrod by noting
that the Jones Act claim in Penrod rested on diversity jurisdiction while
plaintiff Rachal’s at law claim was one of federal question jurisdiction.203
Following Penrod to the letter of its facts, Rachal held that Jones Act

193

Johnson, 264 U.S. at 390–91; see Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 670.
See supra Parts II(C), (D), III, IV(A)(1), (2).
195 See supra Part IV(A)(3).
196 See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 663 (calling the distinction between
one type of at-law jurisdiction over the other with respect to jury trial rights
“unprecedented”).
197 469 F.2d 897, 902–03 (5th Cir. 1972).
198 Id. at 903.
199 Id. at 902.
200 Id. at 899.
201 Compare id. at 899–903, with supra Parts II(A), (B), IV(A)(1), (2).
202 See infra notes 204–11 and accompanying text.
203 Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986).
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claims in diversity vest a right to jury trial to both the plaintiff and
defendant because diversity is an “independent basis” for jurisdiction.204
Recognizing that the jury trial right arises from the text of the Jones
Act, the Rachal court also asserted by fiat that Jones Act claims heard as
federal questions do not confer the right to jury trial to the defendant,
because the right is one granted by statute.205 Rachal noted that in a
nondiversity action, the Jones Act right to a jury trial derives solely from
statute.206 Therein lies Rachal’s conceit: the right to a jury trial at law is
not statutory as Rachal holds, but constitutional.207 Yet, the Rachal court
strangely buried an express admission to the contrary in a footnote,
stating that the true basis for the jury trial was the Seventh Amendment
and that diversity was merely a basis for jurisdiction.208 If so, then why
would all the normative rights to common law jurisdiction, including the
defendant’s right to preserve a jury trial demand, not attend?209 In short,
Rachal both fabricated the distinction between federal question and
diversity jurisdiction for purposes of the vested right to a jury in a Jones
Act claim and also contradicted its own argument.210
The distinction between federal question and diversity jurisdiction
vis-à-vis jury trials is bizarre considering that diversity claims are
tantamount to state general jurisdiction claims heard in a federal forum
simply to avoid parochial local bias.211 If the Seventh Amendment were
inapplicable under one form of jurisdiction but not the other, it should be
inapplicable in diversity jurisdiction since the Seventh Amendment is not
incorporated to the states.212 In fact, it was an open question whether the
Seventh Amendment applied in diversity until the Supreme Court
decided so in Simler v. Conner.213 Federal question civil cases have
always required a jury.214
204

Id. at 1213.
See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 662–63 (stating that Rachal “seized
upon” this distinction in order to control the outcome).
206 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213.
207 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974).
208 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1216 n.8; Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 663 n.90.
209 See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192; Panama R.R Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924)
(noting that jury trial rights are incident to common law jurisdiction).
210 See supra notes 201–209 and accompanying text.
211 Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985).
212 See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192 n.6 (expressly refusing to incorporate the Seventh
Amendment to the states).
213 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 667 n.121; see Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S.
221, 222 (1963) (considering the question whether, and deciding affirmatively that, the
Seventh Amendment applies to diversity actions in federal court).
214 See Simler, 372 U.S. at 222 (considering whether diversity actions, as a matter of
course, would be subject to the Seventh Amendment, as “other actions,”—which can
only mean federal question and statutory jurisdictional claims—already were).
205
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2. Linton’s Problematic Dicta
On the questions actually presented, Linton was well-reasoned.215
By distinguishing, at the very least, between a claim at law in federal
court and a common law/saving to suitors claim in state court, Linton
correctly applied jurisprudence that reaffirmed the states’ sovereignty
over procedure in their own forums and recognized that the Seventh
Amendment is not applicable to state civil trials.216 The Linton court
held that state procedure would follow the plaintiff’s election.217 Again,
almost all courts agree on the point that Jones Act cases in state court
follow state procedure, whatever that may be.218
Linton went further than it needed to, however, by making explicit
what Rachal had implied: it stated that defendants have no vested right to
a jury trial in Jones Act cases pled as federal questions.219 This was
classic obiter dictum because it was wholly unnecessary to determining
whether Jones Act defendants have a right to a jury trial in state court.220
Linton could have ignored Rachal, but it chose to reinforce a dubious
interpretation of the Jones Act.221 As to the jury trial right in state court,
Linton is correct; as to the federal at-law forum, it is superfluous and
suffers the same constitutional defects as Rachal.222
C. Evaluation of the Peters View:
“O, that way madness lies; let me shun that.”223
The thrust of California’s Peters view is that the plaintiff’s election
power is a substantive right not only over jurisdiction but over the mode
of fact-finding at trial.224 Peters effectively read this right as allowing
the plaintiff to choose whether it wanted a jury or nonjury trial in Jones
Act cases, irrespective of the rights California guarantees to its

215 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 663–64 (calling Linton’s explication of a
state’s right to control the jury right in a Jones Act trial “sensible”).
216 Id. at 664; see Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1486–90
(5th Cir. 1992).
217 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490.
218 See supra Part II(A)–(E), (G).
219 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 664; see supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
220 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454–55 (1972) (finding dictum relied
upon by petitioners “unnecessary to the Court’s decision” and not “binding authority”);
see also U.S. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924) (cognizing dictum as
something not binding).
221 See supra note 55 and accompanying text; supra part IV(B)(1).
222 See supra Part IV(A)(1), (B)(1).
223 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 3, sc. 4.
224 See supra Parts II(F), IV(A)(3).
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citizens.225 Because the Peters court cites Rachal and jurisprudence
examining FELA for this proposition, it misreads both. Significantly,
every federal court that has reviewed whether state procedure should
control one’s jury rights in a Jones Act case has demurred from holding
the right to a jury trial is substantive.226 Peters simply misreads
Rachal.227
It also misapplies FELA’s mandatory right to jury trials.228 Dice v.
Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. emphatically stated that “the
right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by
[FELA] to permit it to be classified as a mere ‘local rule of procedure’
for denial in the manner that Ohio has here used.”229 In fairness to
Peters, it is evident from the Supreme Court’s holding in Dice that jury
trials are substantively guaranteed in FELA causes of action.230
Nevertheless, there are five problems with Peters’s application of
FELA’s jury right guarantee to Jones Act cases. First, while the
Supreme Court has recognized that FELA jurisprudence is substantially
persuasive for resolving Jones Act claims, it necessarily cannot always
be binding because of the jurisdictional and substantial factual
differences between railroad casualty claims and claims involving
casualties on navigable waters.231 Second, FELA’s universal guarantee
of a right to a jury trial cannot be fully analogized to Jones Act claims
since the plaintiff does have the right to plead his Jones Act claim in
admiralty where no jury will hear it.232
Third, even if Dice applied to the Jones Act, it would protect the
parties’ rights to a jury in state court, regardless of state court procedure,
and not the right to a nonjury trial.233 There is absolutely no mention of a
railroad employee’s right to a bench trial in Dice.234 Peters set forth the
proposition that jury trial rights are substantive and guaranteed to the
plaintiff no matter the forum, but then fallaciously extended the
proposition to guarantee the plaintiff the right to a bench trial.235

225

See supra Part IV(A)(3).
See supra Part II(A)–(E), (G).
227 See supra Part IV(A)(1), (3).
228 See infra notes 231–38 and accompanying text.
229 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952).
230 Id. at 362–63 (prohibiting a bench trial on issues associated with a FELA claim).
231 See Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958).
232 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 3, at 263; see Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375, 388–89, 391 (1924).
233 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 3, at 263; cf. Dice, 342 U.S. at 363.
234 See generally id.
235 Peters v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 1995 AMC 788, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
14, 1994).
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Fourth, the application of FELA as a guarantee of a nonjury trial is
hard to indulge because it would be unnecessary for a seaman who can
already sue without a jury in admiralty.236
Fifth, and finally, no state or federal court has ever agreed with
Peters’s broad reading that the Jones Act’s jury right substantively
overrides state procedure.237 Peters also conflicts with the opinion of the
Ninth Circuit, i.e., Craig, further highlighting the split of authority on
this issue of the right to trial by jury in Jones Act cases. It also ignores
Panama Railroad v. Johnson’s clear distinction between the jurisdiction
of a Jones Act case and the procedural incidents that arise out of that
jurisdiction, which include the right to trial by jury.238
D. Evaluation of the Bowman View: Here Come the “Ineddicated,
Vulgar, Groveling Wretches”239
In light of the interplay between the original language of the Jones
Act and the analysis provided in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson,
Bowman’s narrow textual analysis regarding the placement of the phrase
right to trial by jury is even more compelling.240 Whether it is true that
Congress intended to establish a negligence cause of action solely at law
without any reference to admiralty jurisdiction whatsoever, or create the
jurisdictional election as Johnson opined, both point to the conclusion
that the phrase right of trial by jury was a modifier of some antecedent.241
Had the Johnson Court read the Jones Act at face value, the phrase right
of trial by jury would have served as one of several linguistic markers
denoting a common law cause of action.242 Even pursuant to Johnson,
however, right to trial by jury is still best interpreted as a linguistic
modifier of the antecedent jurisdictional election.243
Rachal and Linton have attempted to breathe independent life into
right to trial by jury as part of the plaintiff’s election power, an approach
Illinois has soundly rejected.244 Strictly speaking, though, Bowman
suffers from the same problem Linton does, which is that Illinois
engaged in obiter dicta by specifically rejecting Rachal and its line of
236 See Rule 9(h); see also Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 363
(1959) (acknowledging no right to a jury trial in admiralty).
237 See supra Part II(A)–(E), (G).
238 264 U.S. 375, 390–91.
239 See CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 28 (Arthur Pober ed., Sterling Publ’g Co.
2008) (1838) (speaking of juries).
240 See supra notes 100, 176–91 and accompanying text.
241 See notes 100, 176–91 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 176–91 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
244 See supra Part IV(A)(1), (2).
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cases.245 Bowman was actually overruling a lower court’s use of Rachal
as support for the proposition that the plaintiff’s election power includes
control over the right to a jury trial, but the fact that the Bowman court
took the time to expressly reject Rachal technically means it was
engaging in dicta.246 Still, Illinois has both acknowledged the problem
with Rachal and Linton and helped to create a split of authority leading
to Endicott—not just with the Fifth’s Circuit’s view, but also by
extension with the Seventh Circuit’s view.247
E. Endicott’s Confusion and Clarity
The Washington Supreme Court quite boldly states what Panama
Railroad Co. v. Johnson skirted around: the Jones Act by its own terms
established only an action at law.248 The Endicott court recognized that
Johnson was a “fictitious reading of the [Jones Act]” meant to sidestep
constitutional defects.249 The court, however, incorrectly opined that the
“ambiguity” left by Johnson’s creation of the plaintiff’s election power
pitted the Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Louisiana and Illinois against
the Ninth Circuit and California.250 The court clearly missed the nuanced
tripartite view between the various courts and inaccurately conflated the
Ninth Circuit’s view with California’s.
In fairness to Washington, what concerned Endicott, that is, the
issue of whether the right to a jury trial in a saving to suitors case is
procedural or substantive, can elicit only two responses: yes or no. By
the time Washington entered the fray, every court other than the
California Peters court agreed that the saving to suitors clause gave the
states the procedural power to fashion their own common law
remedies.251 It appears Washington conflated Craig and Peters because
both used “exclusio alterius reasoning” to hold that the Jones Act’s
failure to mention the defendant necessarily meant the Act was giving a
unilateral right to the plaintiff to select a jury.252 Fundamentally, though,
Craig does not hold that states must always prohibit defendants from
245 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454–55 (1972); supra note 217 and
accompanying text; see also U.S. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924)
(cognizing dictum as something not binding).
246 See sources cited supra note 245.
247 David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments: Developments
in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 493, 522 (2011).
248 Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 224 P.3d 761, 764–65 (Wash. 2010); see supra
notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
249 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765; see supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
250 See supra Part IV(A) (summarizing the split).
251 See supra Part II.
252 See Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 224 P.3d 761, 765 (Wash. 2010).
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electing jury trials in Jones Act cases.253 Only Peters currently holds
this, which means that Washington is actually not in conflict with the
Ninth Circuit.254 But, because Washington asserts that it conflicts with
the federal circuit in which it lies, this may help draw the Supreme
Court’s attention to the matter.
Also, by “find[ing] the analysis in Bowman persuasive,”
Washington expressly joined Illinois, which explicitly rejected Rachal
and is itself in conflict with its own federal circuit, the Seventh Circuit.255
By expressly following Bowman, Washington added to the confusion
because it effectively asserted the view that the plaintiff’s election power
is the same in both Illinois and the Fifth Circuit.256 Yet, because Endicott
was focused on whether the plaintiff’s election power involved a matter
of jurisdiction, it did not need to address the Fifth Circuit’s
considerations of federal procedural rights in a federal forum. In other
words, on the point that mattered to Washington (jury rights in state
forums) the court was in agreement with the Fifth Circuit and Illinois,
and there really were only two views.257 The Washington Supreme Court
did not need to address the crux of the matter in at-law cases in federal
court; thus, it was unnecessary to formally recognize a doctrinal split
between Illinois and the Fifth Circuit.
Strangely, however, Endicott did informally acknowledge the Fifth
Circuit’s contradictory view toward diversity and nondiversity
jurisdiction in a footnote.258
The Washington Supreme Court
characterized the Ninth Circuit’s view as “uncritically adopt[ing]” the
Fifth Circuit’s view toward diversity- and nondiversity-driven jury
rights.259 The court lent credence to the Fifth Circuit’s distinction by
noting that both cases were “consistent with the jurisdictional
interpretation of the Jones Act.”260 Thus, Endicott implicitly agreed with
Rachal about the distinction between the defendant’s right to a jury trial
vis-à-vis diversity or federal question jurisdiction while expressly
adopting Bowman’s reasoning.261 Nevertheless, Bowman expressly
rejects the jurisdictional distinction Rachal and Linton make.262
253

See Craig v. Atl. Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472, 475–76 (9th Cir. 1994).
See Peters v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 1995 AMC 788, 792 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 14, 1994). Compare Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765, with Craig, 19 F.2d at 475–76.
255 See Endicott, 224 P.3d at 767; supra parts II(D), IV(A)(2).
256 See Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765, 767.
257 See id.; supra Part IV(A)(1)–(2).
258 See Endicott, 224 P.3d at 766 n.1.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Compare id., with id. at 767.
262 Bowman v. Am. River Transp., 838 N.E.2d 949, 957 (Ill. 2005).
254
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V. CONCLUSION
Endicott expressly agrees with the reasoning of both Bowman and
the Rachal-Linton dyad even though Illinois’s and the Fifth Circuit’s
views are irreconcilable. Endicott expressly rejects Craig even though
Craig adopts the reasoning of Rachal and Linton wholesale, leading
Endicott nominally to reject controlling federal law in the Ninth Circuit
where Washington sits. Peters is in conflict with every other case,
including Craig, even though the Peters court purports to have found
support in Rachal and Linton. Rachal contrived a way to ignore Penrod,
previous jurisprudence on point in its circuit, while Linton quite
unnecessarily reinforced Rachal’s mistake. Bowman’s express rejection
of Rachal impliedly puts it in direct conflict with Wingerter, controlling
federal law in the Seventh Circuit where Illinois sits. And Louisiana’s
Parker holding, which comports with Bowman’s (and Endicott’s) views
about state jurisdictional authority over jury trials, relied on the Fifth
Circuit for its reasoning. Finally, Endicott mislabels which jurisprudence
is on which side. This confusion begs for Supreme Court intervention.
Post-Endicott, whenever the next Jones Act case contemplating the
right to jury trial is ripe for review, the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to absolve the courts of their patent confusion. Under Panama
Railroad Co. v. Johnson, as understood by every published decision on
point, states may determine their own common law remedies, including
whether and how to grant jury trials, for all Jones Act cases they hear,
and the Supreme Court should affirm this.
Moreover, there is strong, almost unwavering, support in the federal
courts for the notion that the Jones Act defendant acquires his right to a
jury trial only in a diversity claim at law, and not in a federal question
Jones Act claim. The Supreme Court, however, should not hesitate to
overrule this view. Instead, the Supreme Court should reaffirm the
election power that it bestowed upon plaintiffs in Johnson and that it
administers through Rule 9(h)—the right to determine the jurisdictional
basis and forum for proceeding in Jones Act cases. But once the plaintiff
has selected a common law jurisdictional basis in federal court, the
Supreme Court should vest the right to trial by jury to both the plaintiff
and the defendant. It is only fair, and to do otherwise would be
unseemly. While the Supreme Court gave the Jones Act seaman, the
canonical ward of the admiralty courts in need of greater protections, the
initial unassailable choice to sue for negligence in admiralty or at law,
the Court should also honor the strictures and protections of the Seventh
Amendment, which grants all parties the right to demand a jury once a
claim is filed at law. Such a holding would remedy the current
jurisprudential affray, reinforce procedural fairness once the pleadings
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have been filed, comport with the Court’s own previous jurisprudence,
and, chiefly, honor the Constitution.

